We study the equilibrium effects of mergers between firms with brand portfolios and brand loyal customers for pricing and profitability. We find that the "merger paradox" (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983) is absent in these markets. The acquisition of brand portfolios can be profit enhancing for the merging firms and payoff neutral for the firms not involved in the merger. This may explain the emergence of brand conglomerates such as Richemont, PPR or LVMH.
Introduction
Horizontal mergers of …rms in markets with well-known brand names is a frequent phenomenon. The brand portfolio of an acquisition target is often an important codeterminant of the value of the acquired …rm 1 , and the acquired …rm's portfolio of brands is often continued and promoted by the acquiring company. 2 Some important examples can be seen in the car industry 3 , luxury consumer products 4 , and fashion industry. We study the merger pro…tability in markets which are characterized by such …rms with multipe brands. We assume that customers can either be price sensitive, or may be loyal to one or the other brand, purchasing a product of this brand if and only if the price of the product is not higher than some reservation price. Firms may own several brands which constitute their brand portfolio. They may make pricing decisions on each of its brand in their portfolio. We consider the pro…tability of mergers and acquisitions between …rms with multiple brands. We ask how the pro…tability of merger depends on the composition of the brand portfolio, and how the merger a¤ects bystanding …rms which are not involved in the merger.
The analysis of motives for mergers and acquisitions and the implications of such merger for pro…tability and welfare has been a …eld of very active research for the last 25 years. The formal study of the equilibrium e¤ects on pro…tability of merger has an important starting point in the merger paradox that was derived by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) . Their analysis of mergers in a symmetric Cournot market with constant marginal cost showed that such a merger is typically unpro…table for the …rms that merge, whereas bystanding …rms bene…t from the increase in concentration. 5 A complementary paper by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) who consider
Bertrand markets with di¤erentiated products is the starting point of a long series of studies that describe conditions for which the merger paradox is moderated. A recent (non-exhaustive) survey on the merger paradox is by Huck, Konrad and Müller (2008) . 6 However, a milder version of the merger paradox remains even for many of these studies, including the case of Bertrand competition, as the bystanding …rms would often gain more from the merger than the merging …rms, essentially leading to a situation in which all …rms like mergers, but prefer to let other …rms merge. In our analysis of merger between …rms with multiple brands and brand-loyal customers, the merger is either pro…table for the merging …rms or does not a¤ect their pro…ts. The pro…ts of bystanding …rms are una¤ected. We build on a stock of results from the theory of price competition between …rms who have groups of loyal customers and who also compete for groups of customers who are price sensitive and not loyal to only one or the other brand. This type of competition theory originated with Varian 5 Their basic argument is intuitive and robust. If, for example, three identical …rms A, B and C compete in a Cournot market, each of the …rms makes a pro…t equal to 1/3 of the oligopoly pro…t that emerges in the market with three active …rms. If …rms B and C merge into B&C, from a strategic point of view this leads to a duopoly with two symmetric …rms. The whole industry pro…t in this market increases from that of an oligopoly with three …rms to the duopoly pro…t. But the share of the pro…t that is earned by …rms B and C is reduced from 1/3 + 1/3 = 2/3 to 1/2, whereas bystanding …rm A's pro…t increases from 1/3 of the former oligopoly pro…t to 1/2 of the (higher) duopoly pro…t. This merger paradox was a challenge and triggered numerous contributions. 6 The paradox is weakened by possible synergies (Perry and Porter 1985) , the strategic e¤ects of sequential decision making (Daughety 1990 ), governance structure inside the merged entity (Huck, 
3
(1980) and developed rapidly, with important contributions by Narasimhan (1988),
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) and many others. 7 In Bertrand competition with loyal customer groups, when making pricing decisions …rms must decide whether to choose a high price, by which they are likely to lose all non-loyal customers to other …rms and most likely sell to their loyal customers only, or whether they would also like to compete for the price-sensitive customers. In the latter case, they have to lower their prices, implying that they also sell to their loyal customers at these lower prices. One important property of this type of competition is that it establishes a situation in which many …rms can sustain high prices, with only very few …rms being engaged in price competition. 8 Brands may di¤er in the size of their loyal customer groups, with "weak" brands having few and "strong" brands having many loyal customers. We show that the composition of …rms' brand portfolios matters. The relative size of loyal customer groups in the weaker brands is a key element for the question whether a merger among …rms with brands with loyal customers is pro…table or not, and whether such a merger harms or bene…ts other non-merging …rms in this industry. We …nd that the acquisition of …rms with one or several brands may but need not change the distribution of prices in the Bertrand equilibrium. The relative size of loyal customers of the weakest brands (their "strength") in the acquiring …rm and in the …rm acquired matters. A merger that brings together a set of very strong brands does not a¤ect the pricing equilibrium. There may be possible scale economies and a possible change in the strength of brands due to the movement of ownership of the brand from one …rm to another, which may be pro…t relevant. We remove such e¤ects from the picture and focus on the pure e¤ects of changes in equilibrium pricing. A merger that brings together …rms with the weakest brands in their portfolio can change the equilibrium 7 Recent extensions to this model include Baye and Morgan (2004) pricing and typically has a positive e¤ect on pro…tability for the …rms who engage in the merger, and no pro…tability e¤ects for all other …rms.
Empirically, the role of heterogeneity of customers with some customer groups being loyal to speci…c brands and other customers being sensitive only to prices, is important at least in some markets. Brands play a prominent role in the car market.
Many of the large car companies support and market a whole set of brands. GM and suggest that what …rms acquired in these processes was not mainly aimed at owning a balanced portfolio of di¤erentiated products, but that the acquisition of brands was a key element of these acquisitions of …rms, as acquiring a brand essentially involved the acquisition of a set of loyal customers.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we formally review some of the results in the literature which we use for analysing merger of multi-brand …rms and analyse merger between single-brand …rms. We then turn to the main contribution in this paper and analyse merger between multi-brand …rms. Section 3 o¤ers conclusions. 9 It is important to note that brands are not just horizontally di¤erentiated products. Volkswagen and its subsidiary, Audi, produce a whole set of models and many of these models correspond most closely with each other. From a purely technical point of view, some of their models are very close substitutes, or can even be seen as perfect substitutes, given that they are equipped with the same technology and are even partially produced using the same components. The key di¤erence between these corresponding models is the di¤erence in brand name, and this di¤erence may be important due to brand loyalty. Rolls-Royce is another example. Rolls-Royce produced virtually the same car and sold it using two strong brands: Rolls-Royce and Bentley, the di¤erent radiator grills and cooler bodies being the main distinguishing elements. 10 See, e.g., http://www.richemont.com/our_businesses.html.
2 The merger analysis
We consider the following analytical framework. There is a set S of brand names i, with i = 1; 2; :::s. In the benchmark case which is our point of departure, the number of …rms 1; :::; s is the same as the number of brands and each …rm i produces the same good with the same constant unit cost normalized to zero for simplicity, owns one brand and sells its product using this brand name, chooses a price p i and o¤ers to serve any demand at this price. The choices of prices are made simultaneously and independently by all …rms. There is a large set B of consumers which can be thought of as the unit interval with unit measure. Each consumer may buy exactly one unit from exactly one seller, or may not buy at all. The set of consumers is partitioned into s + 1 groups of size n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n s and m. Consumers from the subset i are loyal to brand i for i = 1; :::s. They buy one unit of the good of brand i if the price p i for this brand is not higher than their reservation price r. We denote the share of consumers which is loyal to brand i as n i , and we assume that brands are numbered according to their strength: 0 n 1 < n 2 < ::: < n s :
Brand j is called weaker than brand j +1, as it has a smaller group of loyal consumers.
The weakest brand is brand 1, the strongest brand is brand s. Strict inequality in (1) is assumed for simplicity, as this helps to eliminate non-generic multiple equilibria.
Further, there is a group of size m of consumers who are not loyal to any of the brands. Hence, the share of non-loyal consumers is m > 0. Consumers who are not loyal purchase the good for the lowest price that is o¤ered. This benchmark case describes the framework analyzed by Kocas and Kiyak (2006) , which generalizes Narasimhan (1988) who considered two single-brand …rms with n 1 n 2 , and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1992) who considered more than two …rms with one brand each, but equally strong brands.
We …rst compare this benchmark case with a situation which may result from a merger. In this alternative situation there is one multi-brand …rm that owns the brands in the subset K S, with the number of elements in K denoted as #K, and #K < s brands and a remaining set of …rms which all own one brand. 11 The multi-brand …rm may, for instance, be the result of a merger, namely if the …rms owning the set K = f1 K ; :::(#K) K g S of brands merge and the resulting …rm maintains all brands formerly owned by the single …rms. 12 For notational convenience, we assume that these brands are sorted by strength, with n i K < n i K +1 . The multi-brand …rm then owns a portfolio of brands 1 K ; :::(#K) K . It therefore internalizes the e¤ects of the choice of the price for one of its brands for sales in one of the other brands. This …rm chooses a vector of prices p K (p 1 K ; :::p (#K) K ) that maximizes this …rm's pro…ts, taking the prices p j chosen by all other single brand …rms j as given. Similarly, these s (#K) other …rms with single brands j = 2 K choose their price p j independently as in the benchmark case. Consumers who were loyal to one of the brands in the benchmark case are assumed to remain loyal to their old brand 13 , and customers without any brand loyalty in the benchmark case remain without brand loyalty.
Our focus is on the implications of merger in this framework and a comparison of …rms'equilibrium payo¤s in the benchmark situation and in the situation with a multi-brand …rm (i.e., after a merger). While we do not address the issue of endogeneity of mergers, the pro…tability of a merger for the merging …rms and for the bystanding …rms is an indication of the merger incentives if merger is endogenous. 14 We …rst recall the equilibrium solution for the benchmark case.
Proposition 1 (Kocas and Kiyak 2006) An equilibrium is characterized by the following pricing strategies: all …rms owning brands j = 3; :::s choose p j = r. The …rms owning brands 1 and 2 choose their prices as mixed strategies described by the 12 As discussed in the introduction, this is what often happened historically, for example, in the luxury consumer products industry or in the car industry. 13 It is not necessarily trivial to acquire a brand and still preserve customer loyalty for this brand (see Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006). The theoretical considerations by Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996) and Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) also show that the independence of brands in the process of a merger should not be taken for granted, as they essentially depart from this assumption. 14 There are many aspects of mergers other than the strategic aspects for market interaction.
Among these are, for instance, possible economies of scale in production, marketing or advertizing, cost of restructuring, information spillovers etc. These other aspects also matter for mergers and acquisitions, but when considering the strategic aspect of a merger for the interaction in the market that is at the heart of the merger paradox, it makes sense to remove these other aspects from the picture.
7
following cumulative distribution functions:
and
) and F i (p i ) = 1 for p i r for i = 1; 2. Firms'payo¤s are j = rn j for all j = 2; :::s, and 1 = n 1 +m n 2 +m n 2 r.
A proof can be found in Kocas and Kiyak (2006) . Some of the properties of the equilibrium can be explained in intuitive terms. Each …rm chooses between two options: extracting a maximum of revenue from its loyal consumers by charging their reservation price, essentially leaving the competition for the non-loyal customers to others, or also competing for the non-loyal customers. In the latter case …rm j chooses a price p j < r. Accordingly, competing for the set of non-loyal consumers has an opportunity cost: it reduces the margin that can be earned on the …rm's loyal consumers. This opportunity cost is higher for …rms which have a stronger brand (i.e., a larger group of loyal customers). The …rms with the weakest two brands have the lowest opportunity cost of lowering prices. This is a competitive advantage. In the equilibrium all strong brands stay out of this competition and simply extract maximally from their loyal consumers. Their competition leads to an equilibrium in mixed strategies. 15 In the equilibrium they both randomize according to the cumulative distribution functions as in (2) and (3) that are the same as in the two-…rm equilibrium analyzed by Narasimhan (1988) . The lower bound of the common support of equilibrium prices is precisely the price at which the …rm owning brand 2 (the second-weakest brand) is just indi¤erent between underbidding this price and winning all non-loyal customers or choosing its reservation price and serving only its own loyal customers.
Proposition 1 provides the point of departure for our analysis. The next proposition considers competition with multi-brand …rms that result from a merger and compare the payo¤s with the benchmark case. 15 An equilibrium in pure strategies for p 1 and p 2 can be ruled out: for each …rm it is either superior to choose a price slightly smaller than a given price chosen by the competitor, or the price chosen by the competitor is so low that it is better not to compete for the non-loyal customers and to resort to the …rm's loyal consumers and charge their reservation price. But then the low price of the competitor is itself not an optimal reply.
Proposition 2 Consider mergers that do not lead to a monopoly. (i) A merger that leads to a multi-brand …rm with a set K of brands such that f1; 2g K is pro…table for the merging …rms and does not change the equilibrium payo¤s for all non-merging …rms.
(ii) If f1; 2g * K, then an equilibrium is characterized by the same pricing behavior as the ones described in Proposition 1, and the merger is neither pro…table nor unpro…table.
Proof. Consider part (i). Let f1; 2g K. Let h be the weakest brand for which h = 2 K. We consider the following pricing strategies as a candidate for an equilibrium.
First, p j = r for all brands j 2 (Snf1; hg. Second, the multi-brand …rm chooses p 1 according to
Third, the …rm that owns brand h chooses p h according to
Given these choices, …rms'payo¤s are j = rn j for all single-brand …rms including …rm/brand h. The multi-brand …rm makes a pro…t equal to rn i K from each of its brands except from brand 1 K (= 1), and the contribution to pro…t by brand 1 is
The merger is pro…table for the merging …rms if
n 2 r. This holds, as n h > n 2 holds as 2 2 K. Note also that bystanding …rms' pro…ts are una¤ected by the merger.
We now show that these pricing strategies are mutually optimal replies. First, we con…rm that F h maximizes h given F 1 and p j = r for all other brand prices.
; r], whereas h = p h (m + n h ) < n h r for p h < n h r n h +m and h = 0 for p h > r. This proves the optimality of F h for the single-brand …rm that owns brand h.
Second, we con…rm that p j = r maximizes j for all other single brand …rms which, by de…nition of h, have a larger group of loyal customers than brand h. Clearly, p j > r is dominated by p j = r. Moreover, for p j < r the payo¤ is
for all p j < r. The latter inequality makes use of the property n j > n h .
Turn now to the optimality of pricing choices of the brands that constitute the merger group. Take F h and p j = r for j 2 Sn(K [ fhg) as given. The multi-brand …rm chooses p K . Let p i min minfp 1 K ; :::; p (#K) K g the smallest component of p K .
Then the multi-brand …rm's payo¤ is
if all p i K r for i K 2 K, and smaller if p i K > r for some i K 2 K.
A necessary condition for this sum to be maximal for a given p i min is that i min = 1 K (= 1), i.e., the weakest brand is assigned the lowest price. This can be con…rmed as follows. The …rst term in (7) depends only on p i min , but not on whether
increased by a joint adjustment of two prices: the price of brand i min is replaced by the price previously assigned to brand 1 K and vice versa.
The necessary condition i min = 1 K can now be used to conclude that p i K = r for all i K 6 = 1 K is a necessary condition for (7) to be maximal. If i min = 1 K , the payo¤ (7) can be increased monotonically by increasing all p i K up to p i K = r for all i K 6 = 1 K . This shows that the optimal reply is p i K = r for all i K 6 = 1 K .
Given that p i K = r for all i K 6 = 1 K , the optimality of
shown by considering the multi-brand …rm's payo¤ as a function of p 1 K , given p i K = r for all i K 6 = 1 K . This payo¤ is
The third term in (8) is independent of p 1 K . The sum of the …rst and second term in (5) it is straightforward to see that the sum of these terms is equal to
; r), zero for p 1 K > r and smaller than
The case (ii) is relegated to the Appendix.
Part (i) is the more interesting part of Proposition 2. It shows that the formation of multi-brand …rms can bene…t the group of merging …rms, provided that the weakest brands are inside this group. The bene…t for the merging …rms comes from the fact that the new multi-brand …rm owns both brands that competed most …ercely in the benchmark case without merger. After the merger the multi-brand …rm owning these brands can control the prices for all its brands and can prevent the brands from competing internally. This will not prevent other single-brand …rms from competing for the non-loyal customers, and typically one of them will lower its price. However, as these non-acquired …rms only have brands that are stronger than the weakest brands acquired and, hence, have higher opportunity costs in this competition, they will compete less aggressively, and this drives up the payo¤ earned on the weakest brand. In the benchmark case, the two weakest brands compete for the non-loyal customers. If both these brands are owned by the acquiring …rm, the acquiring …rm can order the second-weakest brand to charge the consumer reservation price r, rather than compete with brand 1 for non-loyal customers. This relaxes competition and drives up the pro…ts of the acquiring …rm.
To illustrate the anti-competitive e¤ect further with an example, let the three weakest brands with loyal cconsumer groups have size n 1 , n 2 and n 3 and let the set of non-loyal consumers be of size m. In the benchmark case the equilibrium price for brand 3 is p 3 = r , whereas brands 1 and 2 compete choosing mixed strategies (2) and (3). In this competition the …rms end up with pro…ts 3 = rn 3 , 2 = rn 2 and 1 = n 1 +m n 2 +m n 2 r. If …rm 1 acquires …rm 2 (and, hence, brand 2), then …rm 1 can control the pricing for brands 1 and 2 and can prevent brand 2 from competing against brand 1. In the new equilibrium, …rm 1 still cannot simply choose to make p 1 slightly smaller than r and to sell to all non-loyal customers, because this would draw …rm 3 into the competition for the non-loyal customers. Firm 3 essentially assumes the former role of …rm 2. The competition for the non-loyal customers will be between brand 1 and brand 3. The bene…t for the acquiring …rm emerges because …rm/brand 3 is less aggressive than …rm 2 in its pricing behavior, because …rm/brand 3 has a higher opportunity cost of underbidding brand 1 than the opportunity cost of brand 2, because …rm/brand 3 has a larger group of loyal customers than brand 2. As a result, the expected payo¤s 2 = rn 2 and 3 = rn 3 remain unchanged, but the pro…t on brand 1 increases from n 1 +m n 2 +m n 2 r to n 1 +m n 3 +m n 3 r .
The intuition for Proposition 2 carries over to a further acquisition by the multi-brand …rm that enlarges its brand portfolio. Suppose for this purpose that f1; 2g K, and n h = minfn j jj = 2 K g . Then it follows directly from Proposition 2 that any acquisition of a further single-brand …rm other than the one that owns brand h does not change the pricing equilibrium. The payo¤ of the multi-brand …rm simply increases by rn j from acquiring such an additional single-brand …rm. Such a further acquisition is not pro…table. However, if the multi-brand …rm acquires the …rm owning brand h, then this changes the equilibrium. The equilibrium price for this brand in the new equilibrium becomes p h = r, and the weakest brand that is not owned by the multi-brand …rm takes over the former role of brand h. If this is brandĥ, then pĥ changes from pĥ = r to a mixed strategy described by a cumulative distribution function Fĥ as in (3) with nĥ replacing n 2 in (2) and (3).
We can also discuss mergers starting from a case with several multi-brand …rms. For this purpose let there be > 2 …rms, with each …rm owning a (nonempty) portfolio of brands, with these portfolios denoted as sets K 1 ; :::K , such that fK 1 ; :::K g is a partition of S, and K j = f1 j ; :::(#K j ) j g for j 2 f1; :::; g. Note that the case of single-brand …rms is a special case. Further, let the weakest brands in the portfolios of each of the multi-brand …rms be denoted as 1 1 ; :::1 , respectively, and let the numbering of …rms be such that n 1 1 < ::: < n 1 ; i.e., the weakest brand in …rm 1 is weaker than the weakest brand in …rm 2 etc. up to …rm . Each …rm j chooses one price for each of its brands, i.e., a vector of prices p j = (p 1 j ; :::
simultaneously with all other …rms. We can show:
Proposition 3 A pricing equilibrium exists for which p j = r for all j = 2 f1 1 ; 1 2 g, and cumulative distribution functions F 1 1 and F 1 2 for prices p 1 1 and p 1 2 for brands 1 1 and 1 2 as in (2) and (3), with n 1 and n 2 being replaced by n 1 1 (= n 1 ) and n 1 2 ( n 2 ), respectively.
Proof. We only sketch the proof. A full proof applies arguments which, in detail, are very similar to the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2. Consider …rst …rm 1. The optimization problem of …rm 1, given the candidate equilibrium strategies of all other …rms, is exactly equivalent to the problem of the single multi-brand …rm in Proposition 1 to …nd the optimal reply, given that F 1 2 (p 1 2 ) for brand 1 2 , and p j = r for all other brands j 2 (Sn (K 1 [ f1 2 g ), and the optimal reply is exactly the one described in Proposition 2.
Turn now to the other multi-brand …rms j. Consider …rst a …rm j > 2. Given the cumulative distributions
n 1 2 r n 1 2 +m
) and F 1 1 (p) = F 1 2 (p) = 1 for p r, and given
, we con…rm that any vector p j 6 = (r; r; :::; r)
yields a lower payo¤ than the price vector (r; r; :::; r). For anyp j withp i j < r for i j 6 = 1 j , …rm j can increase its pro…t by choosing p j which is identical withp j in all components except in component i j , wherep i j < r is replaced by p i j = r. To see this, note that a change to p i j = r cannot lead to a lower sales revenue on any of j's brands other than i j , but the sales revenue on i j forp i j < r is at most equal to
by n i j > n 1 2 , analogously to the reasoning in (6).
Finally, consider …rm j = 2, given F 1 1 (p 1 1 ) and p i = r for all i 2 (SnK 2 [f1 1 g).
Again, it can be shown that for anyp 2 withp i 2 < r for i 2 6 = 1 2 , …rm 2 can increase its pro…t either by a straightforward increase in p i 2 to p i 2 = r (which is the case ifp i 2 6 = minfp 1 2 ; :::;p (#K 2 ) 2 g, or by simultaneously replacingp 1 2 withp i 2 and by increasing p i 2 to p i 2 = r. This way it can, again, be argued that any optimal reply needs to be of the format (p 1 2 ; r; r; :::; r). From here, the optimizing problem of …rm 2 is reduced to the optimal choice of p 1 2 , and it is analogous to the proof in Proposition 2 to see that any p 1 2 2 [ n 1 2 r n 1 2 +m
; r] is optimal.
In other words, in the equilibrium with several multi-brand …rms, the prices of all brands are equal to the consumers'reservation prices, except for the prices of two brands. These two brands are owned by di¤erent …rms, and one of the two brands is the weakest among all brands. By the notation used here, this weakest brand is 1 1 . The other brand is 1 2 ; it is owned by …rm 2, and it is the weakest brand among 13 the brands owned by …rm 2. Note that 1 2 can be a much stronger brand than most of the brands owned by …rm 1, and it need not be the second weakest brand among all brands. Actual competition for the non-loyal customers occurs through these two brands. The key to the proof of Proposition 3 is the observation that the optimal reply p K j of the multi-brand …rm in the equilibrium given the pricing behavior of all other …rms depends only on the prices chosen by these …rms, but not on whether the prices for all these brands are chosen by a large number of single-brand …rms, or by a smaller number of multi-brand …rms.
Taking Proposition 3 as the point of departure, we can address the question of the pro…tability of a merger. For this purpose note that the equilibrium payo¤s of all multi-brand …rms j 2 are equal to
The payo¤ of the …rm owning brand 1 1 equals
Inspection of these expressions shows our key result: a merger is pro…table only if the merging …rms hold brands 1 1 and 1 2 , or, in words:
Proposition 4 A merger between multi-brand …rms that does not lead to a monopoly increases the sum of the merging …rms' payo¤s if and only if this merger includes …rms owning the brands for which the equilibrium prices are lower on average than the reservation prize for loyal consumers in the pricing equilibrium without merger.
Summarizing, we found that merger is pro…table for …rms if these …rms own the two brands for which a deviation from p j = r is optimal in the equilibrium without merger, that is, if the …rms who own the brands which actively compete for the nonloyal customers merge. While the merger will generally not eliminate competition for the non-loyal customers, it will relax this competition, because this competition will involve a stronger brand than in the absence of the merger, and this stronger brand has a higher opportunity cost of competing for the non-loyal customers.
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Conclusions
Brand loyalty is an important element of …rms'price competition. We consider how ownership of multiple brands a¤ects the outcome of Bertrand competition with many loyal customer groups and with a group of price-sensitive non-loyal customers. Our main research question is how pro…ts are a¤ected by mergers and acquisitions, if the acquiring …rm keeps the brands and acquires the group of loyal customers with this brand. We …nd that many types of merger and the brand portfolio reallocations they imply are neutral as regards their strategic aspects for market competition. However, we also identify mergers and acquisitions that reallocate brand portfolios in a way that has strategic e¤ects for the market competition outcome. Particularly if …rms with weak brands absorb other weak brands, this may shield these weak brands and relax competition among weak brands. It also draws stronger brands into the competition for non-loyal customers. Our results contribute a strategic market-interaction-based explanation to why some …rms acquire large conglomerates of brands.
It is interesting to compare our analysis with the analysis by Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996), as they also refer to car producers with many brands in a merger con- as Pontiac, Cadillac, Hummer, or Opel were acquired rather than newly generated.
An industry structure dominated by the big three, GM, Chrysler and Ford, is mainly the outcome of a wave of new …rm entries, followed by a process of acquistions, mergers and exits. Where …rms acquired a …rm with another brand, they often kept and preserved the acquired brand. 16 We take account of the fact that many multi-brand companies are not the outcome of a process of divisionalization, but of a process of acquisitions, together with the policy to keep the acquired brands alive; hence, mergers and acquisitions need to be explained in many cases, rather than a split-up of …rms in di¤erent, competing brands. In some cases the brand itself may have been the most valuable object acquired. 17 Our framework provides such an explanation.
Appendix
In the Appendix we prove part (ii) of Proposition 2.
Proof. For a proof of part (ii) it is su¢ cient to show that the strategies in Proposition 1 are mutually best replies if f1; 2g * K. Three cases need to be distinguished:
Note that, for all three cases, we can take p j r for granted, as p j > r is clearly dominated by p j = r for all j 2 S.
Consider …rst the case f1; 2g \ K = ?. Given that the single-brand …rms' strategies are optimal replies (which follows directly from Proposition 1), it is su¢ cient to show that, given F 1 and F 2 and p j for all j = 2 K as in Proposition 1, the merged …rm cannot do better than by choosing p i K = r for all i K 2 K. If the multi-brand …rm follows the strategy in the candidate equilibrium, the …rm's payo¤ is equal to
16 Klepper (2002) , for instance, reports that the structure of the US car industry is an outcome of a consolidation process: while more than 500 …rms entered into this market in its …rst 20 years, exits and acquisitions led to an industry which was dominated by GM, Ford and Chrysler, accounting for more than 80 percent of the output in the US car industry in the years after 1930. Klepper presents the acquisitions of Olds Motor Works, Cadillac and Chevrolet by GM as an illustrative example. 17 An example illustrating this claim is the struggle between BMW and Volkswagen over the takeover of Rolls-Royce/Bentley which was a …rm with two strong brands; the struggle ended with each of them obtaining one of the two brands. Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava (2008) report that the value of brands is often a substantial fraction of the takeover price.
If the merged …rm deviates and chooses any other joint distribution F (p K ), the resulting payo¤ is lower. To con…rm this consider any deviationp K 6 = (r; r; :::; r) .
Letp j min the smallest component inp K , withp j min < r. Then the maximum payo¤ that may emerge from this choice for the merged …rm is bounded from above by
(1 F 1 (p j min ))p j min m +p j min n j min + X
The latter inequality follows from inserting F 1 (p) as in (2) and n j min > n 2 .
Consider next the case with 2 2 K, 1 = 2 K. Again, if the multi-brand …rm chooses the same pricing strategy as a collection of single-brand …rms owning these brands, then the remaining single-brand …rms' strategies are individually optimal replies to this strategy by Proposition 1. Consider the multi-brand …rm given F 1 (p)
as in (2) and given p j = r for all j 2 Sn(K [ f1g). Let i K 2 K be sorted by increasing brand strength. Then 1 K = 2 . We …rst show that, for anyp K with p i K 6 = r for i K 6 = 1 a price vector exists that yields higher pro…ts. To see this, several cases need to be distinguished. Ifp i K > minfp 1 K ;p 2 K ; :::p (#K) K g, then a simple increase of p i K from p i K =p i K to p i K = r increases the multi-brand …rm's pro…t by (r p i K )n i K > 0. Ifp i K = minfp 1 K ;p 2 K ; :::p (#K) K g for i K 6 = 1 K , then the following changes in components ofp K increase the …rm's pro…t: an increase from p i K =p i K to p i K = r combined with a decrease from p 1 K =p 1 K to p 1 K =p i K increases pro…ts by at least (r p i K )n i K (p 1 K p i K )n 1 K > 0. This shows that any optimal price vector must be of the form (p 1 K ; r; :::r). But for this set of price vectors, given F 1 (p 1 ), any
; r] yields the same payo¤ and this payo¤ is higher than for any p 1 K > r or for p 1 K < n 2 r n 2 +m .
Consider …nally the case with 1 2 K, 2 = 2 K. Again, if the multi-brand …rm chooses the same pricing strategy as a collection of single-brand …rms owning these brands, then the remaining single-brand …rms'strategies are optimal replies to this strategy by Proposition 1. Consider therefore the multi-brand …rm for given pricing strategies F 2 (p 2 ) as in (3) and p j = r for all j 2 Sn(K [ f2g). Let i K 2 K be sorted by increasing brand strength, such that 1 K = 1, and 2 K > 2. We …rst show that, for anyp K with p i K 6 = r for i K 6 = 1 1 a price vector exists that yields higher pro…t. To see this, several cases need to be distinguished. Ifp 1 K = minfp 1 K ;p 2 K ; :::p s K g, then an increase of p i K from p i K =p i K to p i K = r for i K 6 = 1 K increases the multi-brand …rm's pro…t by (r p i K )n i K > 0. Ifp i K = minfp 1 K ;p 2 K ; :::p (#K) K g for some i K 6 = 1 K , then an increase from p i K =p i K to p i K = r combined with a decrease of p 1 K from
This shows that any optimal reply must be of the form (p 1 K ; r; :::r). But for this set of price vectors, given F 2 (p 2 ), any p 1 K 2 [ n 2 r n 2 +m ; r) yields the same payo¤ and this payo¤ is higher than for any p 1 K r or for p 1 K < n 2 r n 2 +m .
